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Abstract
We consider the problem of predicting human play-
ers’ actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our
goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior
of individual players in previously unseen games.
We study the ability of neural networks to per-
form such predictions and the information that they
require. We show on a dataset of normal-form
games from experiments with human participants
that standard neural networks are able to learn func-
tions that provide more accurate predictions of the
players’ actions than established models from be-
havioral economics. The networks outperform the
other models in terms of prediction accuracy and
cross-entropy, and yield higher economic value.
We show that if the available input is only of a short
sequence of play, economic information about the
game is important for predicting behavior of hu-
man agents. However, interestingly, we find that
when the networks are trained with long enough se-
quences of history of play, action-based networks
do well and additional economic details about the
game do not improve their performance, indicating
that the sequence of actions encode sufficient infor-
mation for the success in the prediction task.
1 Introduction
Predicting human agents’ decisions is one of the most at-
tractive goals and the subject of extensive study both in the
academy and in the industry (e.g., [Rosenfeld and Kraus,
2018; Erev and Haruvy, 2013]). Game theory provides a
framework for studying players’ decisions in strategic in-
teractions (“games”), under the assumption that players are
rational, i.e., the assumption that players choose their ac-
tions so as to maximize their utility. Research in behavioral
game theory asks what happens when the players are hu-
mans, who are not completely rational or just not able to opti-
mize perfectly (e.g., [Camerer, 2011; Kagel and Levin, 2010;
Kagel and Roth, 1995]). In this paper we focus on predicting
human players’ actions in a setting where a game is played
repeatedly. In the repeated game setting the dynamics allow
∗The supplementary materials for this paper are available at:
http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/∼gali n/supp.pdf
for greater complexity and game theory predicts the possibil-
ity of multiple equilibria, but, on the other hand, there may be
behavioral patterns that can be utilized for the prediction.
The prediction task can be addressed at different levels of
aggregation and generalizability. To demonstrate the differ-
ences, consider two players who repeatedly play the “match-
ing pennies” game. At each repetition of the game, each of
the players turns one penny to either heads or tails, and if both
coins match, player 1 receives the two pennies, or otherwise
player 2 receives them.
One approach is to predict the average aggregate behav-
ior of a population of players in the game. Works that pro-
vide such a static prediction showed that they succeed to gen-
eralize across games, i.e., they are able to learn model pa-
rameters in a given set of games and then predict the av-
erage behavior of players in a new game. This category
of predictors includes equilibrium models that predict sta-
tionary distributions of the players’ actions, such as Nash
equilibrium or other equilibrium concepts that are based on
behavioral modeling (e.g., [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995;
Selten et al., 2005]). At this level of the prediction task,
i.e., the aggregate prediction, the best performance one can
hope for is to correctly predict the actual empirical distribu-
tion. However, such a prediction is not really satisfying in a
context of repeated games; returning to our matching pennies
example, a player who uses an aggregate predictor, even the
best one, would not be able to predict better than the uniform
distribution played by a population of players, and thus would
not be able to utilize this predictor to “win” the game.
A second possibility is to specialize in the specific game by
learning the tendencies of players in the game, and then try-
ing to predict the actual actions of players step-by-step. Then,
it is possible to learn, for example, from many instances of
the matching pennies game, that players would tend to, say,
choose 3 times heads and then 3 times tails. Such a predictor
would allow a user to win the game, i.e., manage to achieve
above-average winning rates if utilized for opponent model-
ing – but at the cost of being tailored to the specific game.
In this study we address the combined challenge of pre-
dicting the dynamic step-by-step behavior of players, in pre-
viously unseen games. The behavioral economics literature
suggests learning models that are natural candidates for this
task. These models update their prediction at every step ac-
cording to the previous result’s feedback. They aim to model
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human learning processes and in principle should provide
accurate predictions of human players’ actions. Examples
are the classic reinforcement learning model [Erev and Roth,
1998] and normalized fictitious play [Ert and Erev, 2007;
Erev et al., 2010]. However, these models usually update
their predicted distributions in small steps, and either con-
verge or move slowly between quasi-static distributions, and
it is questionable whether they are suitable for predicting dy-
namic action patterns of individual players. For example, the
above-mentioned models would fail to predict the actions of
a player who periodically alternates between heads and tails.
We study the ability of neural networks to answer our pre-
diction challenge and perform “behavior modeling.” For the
case where the game is played only once, [Hartford et al.,
2016] show that neural networks are able to outperform be-
havioral models in predicting human behavior. Unlike the
behavioral learning models, neural networks learn in advance
a fixed function from one set of instances and then use this
same function to perform a prediction on new instances. It is
not clear a priori whether indeed behavior in repeated games
can be described by a single fixed function that can be gen-
eral to a wide collection of games, or whether behavior can
be predicted only through online feedback. We note that our
behavior-modeling prediction task resembles the task of lan-
guage modeling, where the next word in a text is predicted
from the previous words in the text (e.g., [Rosenfeld, 2000;
Bengio et al., 2003]). From a learning perspective, the two
can be viewed as similar sequence-prediction tasks, but in
behavior modeling all sequences are in principle allowed, and
we do not know in advance whether players’ actions have any
structure that can be generalized across games, and that may
be informative for predicting future actions in new games.
In our supervised learning framework, in the training stage
the input to the network is the game history up to time t and
the output is a prediction of the player’s action at the next
step t + 1. The model parameters are optimized according
to a loss function with respect to the actions that were played
in practice. We use for evaluation the 2x2 two-player game
dataset of [Selten and Chmura, 2008], which consists of 12
games, each with a unique (fully) mixed Nash equilibrium,
from experiments with human participants. Such games are
commonly used in the behavioral literature as a natural test-
ing ground for studying behavior in repeated interactions, and
were shown to give rise to various behavioral biases (e.g.,
[Erev et al., 2007; Kagel and Levin, 2010]). Each game was
played in multiple independent sessions by human players
over 200 game periods. To measure the generalizability of
our models, for each game we train a separate model on the
other 11 games and evaluate the model’s performance on the
12th game. We take the overall performance of a model type
to be the average performance over these 12 models.
We evaluate the performance of two classic network
types—the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) and Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNN)1—in comparison with established
models from behavioral economics and with networks that
1We also tried additional network architectures, including
LSTM, inception and residual networks, but this did not improve
the prediction results. See Section 3 for more details.
are allowed to specialize in the specific game in their training
stage. Our measures of success are the cross-entropy loss and
the prediction accuracy per game period obtained by a model,
as well as the economic value gained by using a model as an
oracle of the opponent’s behavior by a rational player. See
Section 2 for more details about the prediction task, and Sec-
tion 3 for more details about the models.
We start with the most basic input to the network, which
consists only of the actions played by the two players thus
far in the previous game periods. That is, as a first step in
our analysis, we ignore any additional information about the
payoffs of the game and any strategic considerations that the
players may have, and observe, as in a black box, only what
the players actually did. We find that in our dataset these ac-
tions are sufficient input for network models to predict future
human behavior in previously unseen games better than the
static-distribution predictors (Section 4.1) and the dynamic
learning models (Section 4.2), according to all measures:
loss, accuracy, and economic value. We also compare these
“domain-adapted” network models to “specialized” networks
that were trained and tested on independent sessions of the
same game. Specialized models have the advantage of expert
knowledge in a specific game, but on the other hand, focusing
on a specific domain reduces the amount of available training
data and creates a tradeoff on the model’s performance. In
our dataset the specialized network models performed worse
than the domain-adapted network models, but still performed
better than all the non-network models (see Section 4).
Next, we compare the action-based network models de-
scribed above with econ-aware networks that in addition to
the observed actions get as input economic information about
the game. We find that when the networks are trained with
short history sequences, the additional economic informa-
tion is useful and improves the performance of the networks.
However, interestingly, when the history sequence is long
enough, the additional information does not improve the per-
formance, indicating that the actions encode all the informa-
tion necessary to perform the prediction at the accuracy level
the networks obtained. See Section 5 for more details.
To summarize, the main contributions of the present paper
are as follows. This paper is the first to study the task of pre-
dicting human step-by-step behavior in repeated normal-form
games as an offline learning problem, and to show that it is
possible to generalize the predictions across different games.
More specifically, this paper is the first to study action predic-
tion in repeated games with neural network models. We show
that networks are suitable for the task and outperform estab-
lished models from behavioral economics with a significant
gap. In addition, we show for the first time that it is possible
to predict future behavior based only on observed behavior,
without knowing any economic details about the game. This
observation may be useful in other games where the utilities
are the private information of the players and do not appear
in the data. From a behavioral modeling perspective, our re-
sults show that the deviations of human behavior from ratio-
nal play have common characteristics that can be learned and
transferred between different games via fixed functions and
without explicit modeling of player preferences. For a further
discussion of our contributions, see Section 6.
2 Setting and the Prediction Task
For the general repeated game setting, consider n players re-
peatedly playing a game. Denote by Ai the action space of
player i and by ati ∈ Ai the action played by player i at period
t. Denote by a−i an action profile of the players except for
player i (i.e., a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an)). The game
is defined by utility functions ui(ai, a−i) that determine for
each player i his payoff from choosing action ai when the
other players play a−i.
We consider the dataset of 12 different 2x2 games from the
experiment of [Selten and Chmura, 2008]. In 2x2 games there
are two players—the row player and the column player—who
are repeatedly playing according to a utility function that is
defined by a fixed payoff matrix. At each game period, each
player has a binary choice: the row player chooses an action
in {Up,Down} and the column player chooses an action in
{Left,Right}. The payoff matrices of the 12 games are pre-
sented in the supplementary materials. Each of the 12 games
has a unique mixed Nash equilibrium in which each player
plays each of his actions with positive probability.
The data consist of 108 independent experimental sessions:
12 sessions for each of games 1-6, and 6 sessions for each of
games 7-12. In each session there were four row players and
four column players, who repeatedly played a game over 200
periods. See the supplementary materials for more details on
the experimental setup. We exclude from the data the first
and last 10 periods of play of each game in both training and
testing, to remove possible effects related specifically to the
beginning or ending of a sequence of play. The overall size
of the data is 155,520 actions for prediction.
The behavior modeling task is to predict for player i at each
time t = 1...T the player’s next action at+1i . The input is the
history of actions that were actually played by the two players
until time t, and possibly additional economic information
such as the game payoff matrices or functions thereof. The
output of the prediction model is a probability distribution
over the actions Ai. At the training stage, the model observes
sequences of actions played by human players in a set G of
games, on which the model optimizes its prediction, while the
test is performed over sequences of play in game g′ /∈ G.
The metrics we consider are the cross-entropy loss, pre-
diction accuracy and economic value. More formally, let
yti ∈ {0, 1} be the action of player i at time t = 1...T (such
that 0 and 1 stand for Up and Down when predicting for a
row player, or Left and Right for a column player), and let
yˆti ∈ [0, 1] be the predicted probability of action 0. The
cross-entropy loss of a model in game g with n players is:
Lg = − 1n
∑
i
1
T
∑
t y
t
i · ln(yˆti) + (1− yti) · ln(1− yˆti). The
prediction accuracy metric is the percentage of accurate pre-
dictions when choosing the action that maximizes likelihood
in respect to the predicted distribution, and can be written in
a vector notation as 100nT
∑n
i=1 [yi · (1− yˆi) + (1− yi) · yˆi],
where y is the vector (y1i , ..., yTi ) and 1 has the same dimen-
sions as y with all entries set to unity.
The economic value of a model quantifies how much a
player could have earned had he rationally followed (i.e.,
optimized against-) the model predictions. It is the “util-
ity gained by this model,” as percentages from the optimal
utility. Specifically, the utility gained by a model is cal-
culated by using this model as an oracle for a player re-
garding the distribution over the actions of the opponent at
the next step. The player then best responds to this pre-
dicted distribution. I.e., the action of player i at time t given
a prediction (p0, p1) of the opponent’s distribution of ac-
tions is ati = argmaxa∈{0,1} (p0 · ui(a, 0) + p1 · ui(a, 1)).
The economic value metric is counted according to the ac-
tual actions at−i played by the opponent at each time t, and
is taken for each game g with n players over all decision
steps of all players as percentages from the optimal utility:
100 ·
∑
i
∑
t ui(a
t
i,a
t
−i)∑
i
∑
t ui(opt
t
i,a
t
−i)
, where optti = argmaxa ui(a, a
t
−i)
is the optimal choice in hindsight for player i at time t.
After we calculate for each model the three metrics for each
of the games as described above, the loss, accuracy, and eco-
nomic value of a model type are defined as the average of
each metric over the different games, weighted by the num-
ber of prediction steps in each game. So that the performance
of a model type is the weighted average of performances of
12 models of this type, each tested on a game which it did not
observe in the training data and was not optimized for.
3 The Neural Network Models
We test and compare the performance of neural network mod-
els in the task of behavior modeling, as defined in Section 2.
All neural network models were implemented in Keras 2.1.4
[Chollet, 2015] and Tensorflow 1.5.0 [Abadi et al., 2015].
The hyper parameters for the models and the number of layers
and size of each layer were optimized on a validation dataset
that consisted of 5% of the training sequences. Each input to
the model is a sequence of the k previous steps. In principle k
could be the entire game history, but we use k = 20 that was
sufficient for our prediction task (see Section 5). The output
is a probability distribution over the actions Ai of player i.
We focus on the performance of two classic network types:
Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) and Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN). The results we present in the next section
show that even with basic architectures, network models out-
perform the behavioral models. We also tested the perfor-
mance of additional network architectures, however these ex-
periments showed similar or inferior results to the standard
CNN. Specifically, our experiments with inception networks
[Szegedy et al., 2015] and residual networks [He et al., 2016]
(where we replaced the standard convolutional layers of the
CNN with inception modules or with residual blocks) yielded
similar results to the standard CNN model. We also experi-
mented with LSTM networks [Hochreiter and Schmidhuber,
1997; Gers et al., 1999], which are often used for sequence
prediction in other contexts (e.g., in language modeling [Sun-
dermeyer et al., 2012; Greff et al., 2017]). However, single-
layer LSTM models with 100 recurrent units achieved infe-
rior results when compared to the other network models, with
similar performance to the inertia rule.2
2Specifically, the average accuracy, cross-entropy and economic
value of the inception networks were: 79.5%, 0.420 and 87.53%,
respectively; of the residual networks: 79.3%, 0.423 and 87.41%,
respectively; and of the LSTM networks: 74.5%, 0.523 and 82.50%.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Comparison to static distributions: (1a) cross-entropy loss, (1b) prediction accuracy, and (1c) economic value of the network models
and the equilibrium models (see Section 4.1 for more details). The blue horizontal line indicates the performance of the best static distribution
benchmark, and the red line indicates the performance of the random benchmark.
3.1 Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP)
MLPs are fully connected feed-forward neural networks,
which provide a benchmark for the ability of a simple neu-
ral network architecture to model and predict human player’s
actions based on a learned training dataset. We use networks
with two hidden layers, each with 512 units with a point-
wise rectified linear activation function (ReLU), and a two-
unit output layer with a softmax activation function to out-
put a probability distribution over the player’s actions. Train-
ing is performed with dropout regularization [Srivastava et
al., 2014] with a weight deletion rate of 0.3, and we use the
Adam optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] with a learning rate
of 0.0002 and a batch size of 64 sequences. These networks
get the information regarding each input sequence as a sin-
gle vector; i.e., they do not get the temporal dimension of the
data explicitly as a separate dimension of their inputs. Ex-
periments with larger networks with up to 5 layers and layer
sizes of up to 1024 did not change the results. A network with
a single hidden layer (and otherwise same details) did yield
worse performance than the two-layer model.
3.2 Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
CNNs are often used for temporal signal processing (see, e.g.,
[Abdel-Hamid et al., 2014; Gehring et al., 2017]) and are
natural candidates for our step-by-step sequence prediction
task. CNNs are capable of representing local temporal rela-
tions while maintaining a small number of parameters. In the
repeated game setting these can be temporally-local action
and response patterns, which may appear at different places
in the observed sequences. The player’s and the opponent’s
actions are taken as input to the network in two separate chan-
nels, and the convolution is performed over time. We use a
network with two convolution layers, each with 64 5 × 1 fil-
ters, one fully connected layer with 256 units and ReLU ac-
tivation, and a softmax output layer with two units. We use
the same regularization and optimization methods as for the
MLP networks. Experiments with larger networks, with up
to 5 convolution layers and 2 fully connected layers, did not
show any advantage and achieved similar results. We also
tested two single-channel input CNN variants, one with the
same number of parameters as our two-channel model, and
one with a double number of parameters, and found that the
two-channel model had a slight advantage over these variants.
4 Evaluation Results
In this section we evaluate the ability of the MLP and CNN
networks to predict humans’ step-by-step behavior across
games, as described in Section 2. Here we provide the net-
works with the most basic input that consists only of the ac-
tions played by the two players in the preceding k = 20
game periods (in Section 5 we show that this sequence length
was sufficient). That is, we ignore any information about the
game payoff structure or strategic considerations of the play-
ers, and only observe what the players actually did. As we
show next, these actions are sufficient for the network models
to predict human future behavior in previously unseen games
better than the other models we have tested.
4.1 Comparison to Static Predictions
In order to successfully predict the dynamic step-by-step be-
havior, the networks must first be able to be more accurate
than any static predictor that predicts a fixed distribution over
the players’ actions at all game rounds. We thus start by com-
paring the networks with stationary models and benchmarks.
We compare with the following static models and bench-
marks: the benchmark of the best possible static prediction,
which is the empirical distribution of actions actually played
by the players; the random benchmark, which predicts that
players play at each step each of their actions uniformly at
random; Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is the standard game
theoretic equilibrium concept which assumes that each player
perfectly best responds to the other players so as to maxi-
mize his payoff; and all four behavioral equilibrium models
that were studied in [Selten and Chmura, 2008]: (1) Quantal-
Response Equilibrium (QRE), which extends Nash equilib-
rium by allowing the players to make mistakes [McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995]; (2) Payoff-Sampling equilibrium (PSE),
in which players optimize against samples of their payoffs
from each of their own pure strategies [Osborne and Ru-
binstein, 1998]; (3) Action-Sampling Equilibrium (ASE), in
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Comparison to dynamic models and benchmarks: (1a) cross-entropy loss, (1b) prediction accuracy, and (1c) economic value of the
network models, the Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalized Fictitious Play (NFP) dynamic models, and the benchmarks of Inertia
and the Most Frequent action in the previous history (MF). The blue horizontal line indicates the performance of the best static distribution
benchmark, and the red line indicates the performance of the random benchmark (see Section 4.2 for more details).
which players optimize against samples of strategies played
by the other players [Selten and Chmura, 2008]; and (4)
Impulse-Balance Equilibrium (IBE), in which players re-
spond to impulses of the difference between the payoff that
could have been obtained and the payoff that has been re-
ceived, such that for all players expected upward impulses are
equal to expected downward impulses [Selten et al., 2005].
[Selten and Chmura, 2008] have shown that all of these four
behavioral concepts predict human play better than the Nash
equilibrium model.
Figures 1a and 1b present the loss and the accuracy of the
two network types – MLP and CNN – alongside the two
benchmarks and the minimal and maximal performance of
the five equilibrium models we consider. As can be seen, both
network types have significantly lower loss and higher accu-
racy levels than the best static distribution. Figure 1c shows
that this advantage is translated to a large difference also in
the economic value: the network models achieve above 87%
of the optimal value, which is significantly higher than the
78.3% achieved by the best static distribution. This is de-
spite the fact that the networks were unaware of the utilities
in the game during training or prediction. The CNN models
perform better than the MLP models, with an advantage that
is statistically significant according to each of the three mea-
sures at the 3% level (paired-sample t-tests, N = 12). The re-
sults for the individual games show that the advantage of the
neural networks was robust according to all metrics across all
12 games in our dataset (see the supplementary materials).
The comparison between the five equilibrium models
shows that in terms of prediction accuracy they perform simi-
larly, all close to the best static distribution (Figure 1b). How-
ever, in terms of cross-entropy loss (Figure 1a), all equilib-
rium models had higher loss than the best static distribution
(paired-sample t-tests, N = 12, p < 0.05 except for IBE
for which p < 0.08), and in terms of the economic value
that they achieve, their performances vary between a value as
low as the value achieved by the random benchmark and the
higher value of the best static distribution. As could be ex-
pected, the worst performance is obtained by the Nash equi-
librium model, which assumes rationality and is known to be
less suitable for describing human behavior than behavioral
equilibrium models that are based on behavioral tendencies.
4.2 Comparison to Dynamic Predictions
The fact that the network models perform better than the
best static distribution predictor indicates that they do capture
some of the game dynamics and temporal correlations, and do
not only learn stationary distributions. The real competition
however is comparing them to other dynamic models which
change their predictions according to changing inputs. The
dynamic models and benchmarks we compare with the neural
network models are the classic Reinforcement Learning (RL)
model of [Erev and Roth, 1998] and the Normalized Ficti-
tious Play (NFP) model of [Ert and Erev, 2007] which out-
performed all other fictitious play and reinforcement learning
models in [Erev et al., 2010]. Both models update their pre-
dicted distribution at every step according to the payoff re-
sults in the previous steps. The two additional benchmarks
are the Inertia rule that predicts that the player will maintain
the same action that was played in the previous step, and the
Most-Frequent (MF) heuristic, which is a generalization of
the inertia rule that predicts that a player would play the ac-
tion that he most frequently played in the previous k steps.
The parameters of RL, NFP and MF models were optimized
with a grid search for every game according to the other 11
games.3
We also compare our network models, which did not ob-
serve the test game at the training stage, to a Game-Specific
CNN network (CNN-GS) that was trained only on sequences
of the same game as the test game. In this case, for each game
the networks were trained on 11 sessions in games 1-6, and
on 5 session in games 7-12, and were tested on the remaining
independent session. The performance in each game is then
the average performance of the models over the sessions, and
the overall performance of CNN-GS is the average of perfor-
mances in all games (for each performance metric, weighted
3We distinguish between the Inertia and MF benchmarks by re-
stricting the optimization of MF to use k > 1.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Econ-aware networks vs. networks that observe only the actions of the players: the CNN networks’ performance as a function of
the history sequence length given as input, in terms of (3a) cross-entropy loss, (3b) prediction accuracy, and (3c) the economic value obtained
in percentages of the optimal value in the games (see Section 5 for more details).
by the number of sessions). For game-specific networks there
is a tradeoff between the specific information that the network
observes about behavior in the specific game, and the reduced
amount of data that is available for this game only.
Figures 2a and 2b present the loss and accuracy of the MLP
and the CNN networks, compared with the dynamic models
and benchmarks and with the game-specific networks. As
can be seen, all the neural-network models outperform all the
non-network models in terms of prediction loss and accuracy.
The CNN models have the best performance, with an overall
loss of 0.42 and accuracy of 79.5%. Figure 2c shows the eco-
nomic value obtained using the predictions of each model.
We see that all the dynamic models and benchmarks yield
higher economic value than static distribution predictors, and
that again the neural network models outperform all the non-
network models and benchmarks, with the best performance
of 87.5% of the optimal value that could have been obtained
in the games achieved by the CNN models. The advantage
of the CNN models was statistically significant according to
all three metrics (paired-sample t-tests, N = 12, p < 0.03
in comparison with MLP and p < 0.0001 in all other com-
parisons except for the comparison with CNN-GS on the eco-
nomic value for which p = 0.23).4
A comparison of the specialized network models (CNN-
GS) to the domain-adapted network models (CNN and MLP)
shows that the specialization-data tradeoff was not in favor of
these networks. The CNN-GS achieved worse performance
than the other networks according to cross-entropy loss and
accuracy, but still outperformed all non-network models and
benchmarks. When testing CNN-GS models only on the six
12-session games – excluding the games with only 6 ses-
sions, where the data tradeoff is more severe – we see an im-
4All differences seen in Figure 2 were statistically significant at
least at the 3% level (paired sample t-tests, N = 12), except for the
tests that compare the loss of NFP vs. the best-static distribution; the
accuracy of CNN-GS vs. Inertia and RL vs. MF; and the economic
value of CNN-GS vs. the two other network models, RL vs. Inertia,
NFP vs. MF and MF vs. the best-static distribution.
provement in the performance to a loss of 0.448, accuracy of
77.6%, and economic value of 87.4%.
5 Economic Features
The results in the previous section show that it is possible
to predict future actions of individual players based solely on
their observed history of actions, and that neural networks can
successfully generalize and perform the prediction on previ-
ously unseen games at almost 80% accuracy level, without
using any information about the structure of the new game.
Now we ask whether adding economic information improves
the quality of the predictions. For this we train econ-aware
models, that in addition to the input of the actions that were
played get as input the obtained and forgone payoffs of both
players in a given interval of game history, and the payoff
matrix of the game. We compare the performance of these
models to the action-only aware CNN models when given as
input history sequences of different lengths k.
Figure 3 shows the performance of the econ-aware mod-
els and of the action-only aware models as a function of the
length of the history sequence input, in terms of cross-entropy
loss, accuracy and economic value. The orange lines indi-
cate the performance of the econ-aware models and the blue
lines are of the action-only aware models, averaged over the
models of the 12 games. First we see that both models im-
prove their performance when given inputs of a longer history
sequence. This improvement saturates around a sequence
length of 20 game periods.5 For short sequence lengths, as
could be expected, the ability of the action-only aware mod-
els is impaired, and for an input of length 1 these networks do
not perform much better than the inertia rule (see Figure 2).
For these short sequence length inputs, additional economic
information significantly improves the ability of the networks
to predict the next steps according to all three metrics. How-
ever, when looking at models trained on longer sequences, the
5We also tested sequences of up to 100 periods and these did not
improve the results.
additional economic information no longer improves the pre-
diction results. At sequence lengths of above 11 game rounds,
the action-only aware models succeed in the prediction task
better than the econ-aware models according to all metrics:
loss, accuracy and economic value.
We see that, at least in our setting, a history of the past 20
steps is sufficient for predicting future actions of players. Al-
though at first glance this seems like a rather short period of
time to encode all the considerations that our human players
may have, note that actually a sequence of length 20 with two
players and two actions allows for 420 (about a trillion) pos-
sible sequences that are all allowed by the game rules, which
is a very rich phase space. The fact that conditional predic-
tion is possible at all in this vast space of configurations indi-
cates that there are indeed (possibly complicated) regularities
in the way human players play, that are general across differ-
ent games.
6 Conclusion
In this study we addressed the challenge of predicting the
actions of individual human players in repeated games, and
generalizing this prediction to previously unseen games. We
found that neural networks are able to perform this task well,
and that even when they are given only the players’ empirical
actions as input they outperform behavioral models that ex-
plicitly take into account the economic considerations of the
players and aim to model their decision-making processes.
The advantage of the neural networks was with a significant
gap in terms of all three metrics that we considered: cross-
entropy loss, prediction accuracy, and economic value.
We further showed that when the networks are trained
on short sequences of history of play, economic informa-
tion about the utilities in the game improves their prediction
performance, as could be expected. However, interestingly,
when trained on long enough sequences, this information is
no longer required, and in fact the networks that are based
only on the players’ actions perform better than the econ-
aware networks according to all three metrics. Of course,
it is unlikely that the players ignore the economic informa-
tion of the game, but our results indicate that the sequences
of joint action profiles encode all the information that is use-
ful for the prediction of the players’ next actions. This result
may be particularly useful in other domains, such as predict-
ing human players’ decisions in online auctions, where there
are large amounts of data of the players’ previous actions, but
their utilities are their private information and are not avail-
able in the data. This observation is conceptually inline with
recent works in econometrics showing that inference of play-
ers’ private parameters should be based on the action distri-
bution rather than on specific equilibrium calculations [Nisan
and Noti, 2017]. It is interesting to study further this connec-
tion between the input to neural networks and their ability to
predict human players’ decision making, and test if similar
results hold in other contexts as well and whether it is pos-
sible to improve the prediction performance by using other
network architectures.
Finally, as in other domains where neural networks are suc-
cessfully utilized for prediction, they have the disadvantage of
working as a black box, in contrast to behavioral models that
explicitly describe the decision-making processes of human
players; yet, the success of networks in the prediction task,
and the gap we have shown above the performance of the be-
havioral models, may provide insights regarding the degree
of regularities that exist in data of human interactions – reg-
ularities that may then be captured by improved behavioral
models.
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